Optimal State Estimation Synthesis over Unreliable Network in Presence
  of Denial-of-Service Attack: an Operator Framework Approach by Naghnaeian, Mohammad
Optimal State Estimation Synthesis over Unreliable Network in
Presence of Denial-of-Service Attack: an Operator Framework
Approach
Mohammad Naghnaeian
Abstract— In this paper, we consider the problem of state-
estimation in the presence of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack.
We formulate this problem as an state estimation problem for a
plant with switching measured outputs. In the absence of attack,
the state-estimator has access to all measured outputs, however,
in the presence of attack, only a subset of all measurements
are made available to the state-estimator. We seek to find an
state-estimator that results in the minimum estimation error
for the worst-case attack strategy. First, we parameterize the
set of all state-estimators that result in stable estimation error
for the worst-case attack scenario. Then, we will show that
any state-estimator in this set can be written as a generalized
Luenberger observer with an appropriately defined observer-
gain. This observer-gain, in general, can be an operator and
possibly unbounded as opposed to the classical static observer-
gain. Furthermore, we will show that finding the optimal state-
estimator that results in the minimum estimation error can
be cast as a convex program over the set of stable factors of
the observer operator-gain. This optimization in, in fact, linear
programming and tractable.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern cyber-physical systems (CPS) typically consist of
many smaller components that are spread over a large spatial
domain. The performance of the system, in whole, depends
on the synergistic integration of computational components
such as control or estimation algorithm and physical com-
ponents such as actuators or sensors. Connectivity to the
outside world and the critical nature of CPS has made such
systems hot targets for adversarial attacks, see e.g. [1] and
[2]. Denial-of-Service attack is an adversarial attack in which
the attacker disrupts the exchange of the information [3]. In
the control theoretic context, the disrupted information could
be sensor measurements or control inputs to the actuators.
In this paper, we seek to design state-estimators that are
resilient with respect to the DoS attacks on the measurement
channels. Such a problem has been given some attention
in the literature, e.g., in [4], [5], and [6]. Most of the
existing results aims at optimizing a cost-function, which
is a measure of estimation error, over a finite horizon in
the stochastic/probabilistic framework where a distribution
form for the attacker or transmitter is assumed. In this
paper, however, we address this problem in the deterministic
framework and infinite horizon objective.
Our perspective is to think of a DoS attack as a switch and
model the system as a Linear Switching System (LSS). The
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attacker’s strategy is to choose the switching to maximize the
estimation error and possibly destabilize that while having
a complete knowledge about system. On the other hand,
the state-estimator’s strategy is to minimize the estimation
error based on the available sensor measurements as well
as the current and past actions of the attacker. We first,
parametrize the set of all state-estimators that result in
bounded estimation error. We refer to such state-estimators
as stable estimators. Then we will define a new class
of state observers mimicking the conventional Luenberger
observers. We will refer to this new class as generalized
Luenberger observers. A generalized Luenberger observer,
in form, is very similar to a classical Luenberger observer
with a significant difference that its observer gain is an
operator, and possibly an unstable one, as opposed to a static
gain in the classical observer. By allowing the Luenberger
observe to have an operator-gain, we will show that the set
of generalized Luenberger observers capture all stable state-
estimators. This, by itself, is a new result to the best of
our knowledge. Then, in order to find the optimal observer
resulting in he minimum estimation error, we formulate the
problem as a convex optimization over the stable factors of
the observer operator-gains. These factors, and the resulting
observer operator-gain, are switching operators that causally
depend on the switching sequence (attacker’s strategy). Find-
ing the optimal state-estimator, in fact, can be cast as a linear
program and hence is tractable.
Our approach relies on utilizing the operator framework
which was first introduced and developed in [7] and [8]. This
operator framework provides a powerful tool to study any
type of linear system, time invariant, time varying, delayed,
switching, etc., in a unified way. Recently, the author has
used such a framework for the synthesis of decentralized
controllers [9]. In what follows, we first review some results
on the switching systems and their operator representation
and then present our results on optimal state-estimator design
subject to DoS.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Generic Notation
We use Rn for the set of vectors of real numbers of di-
mension n. Given x= {x(k)}nk=1 ∈Rn, its l∞ norm is defined
as ‖x‖=maxk∈{0,1,...,n−1} |x(k)|. For a (infinite dimensional)
sequence x = {x(k)}∞k=0 with x(k) ∈ Rn, the l∞ norm is
defined by ‖x‖= supk ‖x(k)‖ whenever finite. The space of
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sequences with elements in Rn whose l∞ norm is bounded is
denoted by ln∞. Throughout this paper, we view linear systems
as mapping on the space of ln∞, for some positive integer n. In
general, for two normed spaces (X ,‖.‖X ) and (Y,‖.‖Y ) and a
linear operator R : X →Y , the induced norm of this operator
is given by ‖R‖X−Y := supx 6=0 ‖Rx‖Y‖x‖X . The operator R is said
to be bounded if its induced norm is finite. In this paper, we
typically have X = ln∞ and Y = l
m
∞ , for some positive integers
n and m, and we simply write ‖R‖ to denote the ln∞ to lm∞
induced norm of the operator R. Any linear causal operator R
can be thought of as an infinite dimensional lower triangular
matrix,
R =

R0,0 0 0 · · ·
R1,1 R1,0 0 · · ·
R2,2 R2,1 R2,0
...
...
. . .
 . (1)
Definition 1: A causal operator R given by (1), is said to
be bounded or stable (on the space of l∞ sequences) if
sup
k
∥∥[ · · · Rk,2 Rk,1 Rk,0 ]∥∥< ∞.
Given a sequence x = {x(k)}∞k=0, the delay or shift oper-
ator Λ is defined by
Λkx =
0, ...,0︸ ︷︷ ︸
k zeros
,x(0) ,x(1) , ...
 .
Definition 2: A linear causal map R is called time-
invariant if ΛR = RΛ.
A Linear Time-Invariant (LTI) operator R is fully charac-
terize by its impulse response denoted by {R(k)}∞k=0 and its
infinite dimensional matrix representation is given by
R =

R(0) 0 0 · · ·
R(1) R(0) 0 · · ·
R(2) R(1) R(0)
...
...
. . .
 .
A Linear Time-Varying (LTV) system R can also be written
in state-space representation as
R :
{
x(t+1) = A(t)x(t)+B(t)w(t)
y(t) =C (t)x(t)+D(t)w(t) , with x(t0) = x0,
(2)
where u(t) ∈ Rm,x(t) ∈ Rn, y(t) ∈ Rp, and x0 ∈ Rn are
input, state, output, and the initial condition of the system
and A(.), B(.), C (.), and D(.) are matrices with appropriate
dimensions for all t. Throughout this paper, we think of linear
systems as operators and hence we do not directly work with
the state-space representation. We, rather, convert the state-
space (2) to (1). To do so, given a sequence of matrices
{A(k)}∞k=0, we define A¯ to be the diagonal operator
A¯ =
 A(0) 0 · · ·0 A(1)
...
. . .
 . (3)
Using this notation, we can define diagonal operators A¯, B¯,
C¯, and D¯ and rewrite (2) as
R :
{
x = ΛA¯x+ΛB¯w+ x¯0
y = C¯x+ D¯w , (4)
where x¯0 =
0, ...,0︸ ︷︷ ︸
t0 zeros
,x0,0,0, ...
, x = {x(t)}∞t=0, y =
{y(t)}∞t=0, w = {w(t)}∞t=0, and Λ is the delay operator. The
above representation of R is referred to as the operator form.
Definition 3: System R in (4) is said to be stable or
bounded if it is a bounded operator from
(
x¯0
w
)
to(
x
y
)
. More precisely, R is stable if there exists a non-
negative real number γ ≥ 0 such that max{‖x‖ ,‖y‖} ≤
γ max{‖x¯0‖+‖w‖} for all x¯0,w ∈ l∞.
B. Linear Switched Systems
In this section, we need to review some standard results
on Linear Switched Systems (LSS) presented in [7] and [8].
A Linear Switched System, Pσ , can be represented in state-
space by
Pσ :
{
x(t+1) = Aσ(t)x(t)+Bσ(t)u(t)
y(t) =Cσ(t)x(t)+Dσ(t)u(t)
, (5)
where σ = {σk}∞k=0 is called the switching sequence that
takes values a finite set. Sometimes, σ is restricted to be in
the set of admissible switching sequences Ξ. In the operator
framework, (5) can be written as
Pσ :
{
x = ΛA¯σx+ΛB¯σu+ x¯0
y = C¯σx+ D¯σu
, (6)
where A¯σ = diag
(
Aσ(0),Aσ(1),Aσ(2), ...
)
and B¯σ , C¯σ , and D¯σ
are defined analogously.
There are important sub-classes of LSS that are of interest
in this paper. These are the LSS whose state matrices, A-
matrices, remain constant and are defined below:
Definition 4: We say a LSS Pσ is an input-output LSS of
degree M, for some positive integer M, if it can be written,
in state-space, as follows
Pσ :
{
x(t+1) = Aσ(t)x(t)+Bσ(t)u(t)
y(t) =C{σ(k)}tk=t−M+1x(t)+D{σ(k)}tk=t−M+1u(t)
.
(7)
We will denote the class of such systems by S MIO and SIO =∞⋃
M=1
S MIO.
We are also interested in a subclass of input-output LSS,
output-only switching, as follows:
Definition 5: A LSS Pσ is said to be an output-only LSS
of degree M if it admits the realization
Pσ :
{
x(t+1) = Aσ(t)x(t)+Bu(t)
y(t) =C{σ(k)}tk=t−M+1x(t)+D{σ(k)}tk=t−M+1u(t)
.
(8)
The class of such systems is denoted by S MO and SO =∞⋃
M=1
S MO .
The classes of input-output and output-only LSS are
rich classes since any stable LSS can be approximated by
elements of SO and SIO with arbitrary accuracy.
Lemma 6: Let Pσ be a stable LSS and ε > 0. Then, there
exist an integer M, P¯σ ∈S MIO, and P˜σ ∈S MO such that
‖Pσ − P¯σ‖ < ε,∥∥Pσ − P˜σ∥∥ < ε,
for any switching sequence σ . Moreover, P¯σ and P˜σ can be
made FIR (Finite-Impulse-Response).
Furthermore, there exist tractable and exact expressions to
calculate the l∞ induced norm of LSS. In [8], it is proved that
the gain computation can be cast as a Linear Program. We
do not review those results here but rather refer the reader
to [8].
III. PROBLEM SETUP
Consider a linear plant given by
x = ΛA¯x+ΛB¯w+ x¯0,
yi = C¯ix+ D¯iw, (9)
where x and w are the states and exogenous disturbances,
respectively, and yi’s, for i = 1,2, ...,N for some integer
N, are the measurements/observations from this system.
In this paper, we address the problem of remote state-
estimation where some of the measurements, yi’s, might
not be available to the state-estimator due to intermittent
communication network or Denial-of-Service type of attack.
In the ideal nominal operating condition, when there is no
DoS attack, the state-estimator receives all yi’s. That is,
available information to the state-estimator, ya, is given by
y0a =

y1
y2
...
yN
=

C¯1
C¯2
...
C¯N
x+

D¯1
D¯2
...
D¯N
w. (10)
However, when a DoS attack occurs at the measurement
channel, the state-estimator only receives a subset of mea-
surements. In this case,
yσ(t)a (t) = Eσ(t)y0a(t), (11)
where Eσ(t) is a block diagonal matrix with identity corre-
sponding to yi’s that are available to state-estimator and zero
otherwise. In the above expression, σ (.) is the switching
signal orchestrating between modes of the system and take
value in some finite set. We use the zeroth mode to denote
the nominal mode. For a concrete example see below:
Example 7: Consider a system in Figure 1 where there are
two measurements, y1 and y2. Suppose, the plant is unstable
Fig. 1. DoS attack only on y2 channel.
LTI given by
x(t+1) =
 1 0 1−1 1 1
−1 0 2
x(t),x(0) =
 0.10.2
−0.1
 ,
and the measurements are given by
y1 (t) =
[
0 1 0
]
x(t)+2w1 (t) ,
y2 (t) =
[
1 −1 −2 ]x(t)+0.01w2(t),
where |wi (t)| ≤ 1, for i= 1,2. In this example, y1 is a reliable
measurement but with higher level of disturbance and y2 is an
unreliable measurement with lower level of disturbance. The
DoS type of attack may result in measurement y2 to not reach
the state-estimator. In this case, the available information, at
each time instant, to the state-estimator, ya (t) is given by
(11), where
y0a (t) =
[
y1 (t)
y2 (t)
]
,
and
Eσ(t) ∈
{[
I 0
0 I
]
,
[
I 0
0 0
]}
.
Therefore, yσ(t)a =Cσ(t)x+Dσ(t)w where
Cσ(t) ∈
{[
0 1 0
1 −1 −2
]
,
[
0 1 0
0 0 0
]}
, (12)
Dσ(t) ∈
{[
2 0
0 0.01
]
,
[
2 0
0 0
]}
. (13)
Similarly to this example, we can rewrite (11) in the
operator framework and combine with (9)-(10) to obtain the
following plant and attack model:
x = ΛA¯x+ΛB¯w+ x¯0,
yσa = C¯
σx+ D¯σw,
where the switching sequence σ (.) is the attacker’s strategy;
we use σ (t) = 0 to denote the nominal condition at time
instant t. In this expression, yσa is the sequence of available
information to state-estimator and σ belongs to the set of
admissible sequences Ξ. In the above example, Ξ is the set
of binary sequences.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
A. Parametrization of State-Estimators
In this section, we are interested to parametrize the set of
state-estimators. A state-estimator is a causal map, Tσ , from
the available measurements, yσa , to a signal xˆ which is the
estimation of state x. That is,
xˆ = Tσyσa . (14)
In the above expression, the dependency of the state-
estimator on σ is made explicit. We emphasize that σ (.)
is the attacker’s strategy which is causally known to the
state-estimator. That is, the state-estimator, at any given time,
does not know the attacker’s intention in future but know
its current and past actions. Therefore, Tσ only causally
depends on σ . In fact, a generic LSS as given in (5)
respects this causality. Henceforth, whenever an operator’s
dependency on σ is stated, causal dependency is assumed.
Definition 8: We say an state-estimator (14) is stable if
the estimation error x˜ := xˆ− x is a bounded signal.
In the sequel, we first parametrize the set of all stable
state-estimators and then we will present our result on the
synthesis of optimal state-estimator that is resilient the DoS
attacks.
Lemma 9: The set of all stable state-estimators (14) that
result in a bounded estimation error is parametrized by
bounded operators Tσ and Xσ such that[
Tσ Xσ
][ C¯σ
ΛA¯− I
]
= I, for all σ ∈ Ξ. (15)
In this case, the state-estimator and estimation error are given
by (14) and
x˜ = Xσ (ΛBw+ x¯0) .
Proof: Let the state-estimator given by (14). Then, the
error is given by
x˜ = Tσ
(
C¯σx+ D¯σw
)− x = (TσC¯σ − I)x+Tσ D¯σw
=
(
TσC¯σ − I)(I−ΛA¯)−1ΛBw
+Tσ D¯σw+
(
TσC¯σ − I)(I−ΛA¯)−1 x¯0.
Notice that x˜ is a bounded signal for bounded w, x¯0, and σ ∈
Ξ if and only if the mappings Tσ and
(
TσC¯σ − I)(I−ΛA¯)−1
are bounded. Define
Xσ :=
(
TσC¯σ − I)(I−ΛA¯)−1 .
Post-multiplying both sides by
(
I−ΛA¯), we obtain
Xσ
(
I−ΛA¯)= (TσC¯σ − I) ,
which is equivalent to (15) and this completes the proof.
Traditionally, the state-estimation has been carried out
utilizing Luenberger observers. Luenberger observers, in
their conventional shape, form a strict subset of all stable
state-estimators parametrized above. In what follows, we
introduce the Generalized Luenberger Observers that differ
from conventional ones in that their observer gains are (pos-
sibly unstable) operators as opposed to static. A generalized
Luenberger is of the form
xˆ = ΛA¯xˆ+Lσ
(
C¯σ xˆ− yσa
)
, (16)
where xˆ is the estimation of the state, L is the observer
(possibly unbounded )operator-gain, and yσa is the available
information to state-estimator.
Theorem 10: Any stable state-estimator can be written as
in (16) for an appropriate Lσ in the form
Lσ = (I+Qσ )−1 Zσ , (17)
where Qσ and Zσ are stable operators satisfying
sup
σ∈Ξ
{
ΛA¯+
[
Zσ Qσ
][ C¯σ
ΛA¯− I
]}
= 0. (18)
Conversely, any generalized Luenberger observer (16) with
observer operator-gain L in (17) is a stable state-estimator if
sup
σ∈Ξ
∥∥∥∥ΛA¯+ [ Zσ Qσ ][ C¯σΛA¯− I
]∥∥∥∥< 1. (19)
Proof: Suppose
xˆ = Tσyσa ,
is a stable state-estimator for all σ ∈ Ξ. By Lemma 9, Tσ
must be bounded and there exists a bounded operator Xσ
such that (15) holds. Now, define Zσ and Qσ as follows:
Zσ : =−Tσ ,
Qσ = −I−Xσ .
Then, direct calculation verifies
ΛA¯+
[
Zσ Qσ
][ C¯σ
ΛA¯− I
]
= ΛA¯+
[ −Tσ −I−Xσ ][ C¯σΛA¯− I
]
= ΛA¯−TC¯σ + I−ΛA¯−XσΛA¯+Xσ
= −TC¯σ + I+Xσ (I−ΛA¯)
= −[ Tσ Xσ ][ C¯σΛA¯− I
]
+ I
= 0,
which implies (18) is satisfied. Therefore, any stable state-
estimator can be written as a generalized Luenberger ob-
server. It remains to show the converse. That is, any gen-
eralized Luenberger observer (16) with observer operator-
gain (17) and (19) results in a stable state-estimator. Given
a generalized Luenberger observer (16), its estimation error
is given by
e = xˆ− x = ΛA¯xˆ+Lσ (C¯σ xˆ− yσa )−ΛA¯x−ΛB¯w− x¯0
=
(
ΛA¯+LσC¯σ
)
e−Lσ D¯σw−ΛB¯w− x¯0. (20)
Assuming (17)-(18), there exists a bounded operator E σ with
‖E σ‖< 1 such that
E σ = ΛA¯+
[
Zσ Qσ
][ C¯σ
ΛA¯− I
]
(21)
= (I+Qσ )ΛA¯+ZC¯σ −Qσ
= (I+Qσ )ΛA¯+(I+Qσ )LσC¯σ −Qσ .
Therefore,
ΛA¯+LσC¯σ = (I+Qσ )−1 (Qσ +E σ ) .
Using this expression in (20), we obtain
e = −{I− (ΛA¯+LσC¯σ)}−1 {LD¯σw+ΛB¯w+ x¯0} (22)
= −{I−E σ}−1 {Zσ D¯σw+(I+Qσ )ΛB¯w+(I+Qσ ) x¯0} .
Notice that, since ‖E σ‖< 1, we have that∥∥∥E σ {I−E σ}−1∥∥∥≤ ‖E σ‖
1−‖E σ‖ ,
and hence the error, e, in the above expression is a bounded
signal. In fact,
‖e‖ ≤ 1
1−‖E ‖ ×
{‖(I+Qσ )ΛB¯+Zσ D¯σ‖‖w‖+‖(I+Qσ )‖‖x¯0‖} .
This implies that any generalized Luenberger observer, with
(16) and (17)-(18), is a stable state-estimator and completes
the proof.
B. Optimal State-Estimator
In this part, we present a resilient state-estimation design
based on Theorem 10. We are interested to find the optimal
state-estimator such that the estimation error is minimized.
According to Theorem 10, any stable state-estimator can be
written as
xˆ = ΛA¯xˆ+Lσ
(
C¯σ xˆ− yσa
)
,
where, given ε ∈ [0,1), there exist stable Qσ and Zσ such
that
Lσ = (I+Qσ )−1 Zσ ,
sup
σ∈Ξ
∥∥∥∥ΛA¯+ [ Zσ Qσ ][ C¯σΛA¯− I
]∥∥∥∥< ε. (23)
In above expression, the dependency of Lσ , Qσ , and Zσ
on the switching signal is made explicit. The underlying
assumption here is that the state-estimator knows the strategy
of the attacker causally. That is, at each given time t, the
state-estimator has the knowledge {σ (0) ,σ (1) , ...,σ (t)},
but does not know the attacker’s strategy in future. We want
to find Qσ and Zσ such that while (23) is satisfied the
estimation error is minimized. The error estimation is derived
in the proof of Theorem 10 given by
e =
−{I−E σ}−1 {Zσ D¯σw+(I+Qσ )ΛB¯w+(I+Qσ ) x¯0} ,(24)
= −{I−E σ}−1× (25){[
ΛB¯ I
]
+
[
Zσ Qσ
][ D¯σ 0
ΛB¯ I
]}[
w
x¯0
]
. (26)
where
E σ=ΛA¯+
[
Zσ Qσ
][ C¯σ
ΛA¯− I
]
.
Theorem 11: There exists a stable state-estimator such
that the induced norm from
[
w
x¯0
]
to the estimation error e
is less than some positive real number γ if and only if there
exists stable operators Qσ and Zσ such that∥∥∥∥[ ΛB¯ I ]+ [ Zσ Qσ ][ D¯σ 0ΛB¯ I
]∥∥∥∥ ≤ γ, (27)
ΛA¯+
[
Zσ Qσ
][ C¯σ
ΛA¯− I
]
= 0, (28)
for any σ ∈ Ξ. In this case, the optimal cost is defined by
γ∗ = inf
(γ,Qσ ,Zσ )
sup
σ∈Ξ
γ, (29)
subject to (27)-(28).
Proof: From Theorem 10, the set of all stable state-
estimator is parametrized by (Qσ ,Zσ ) such that (17) and
(18) hold. We notice that (18) is the same as (28) and ,
from (22), the induced norm from
[
w
x¯0
]
to e, when (28) is
satisfied is given by∥∥∥∥[ ΛB¯ I ]+ [ Zσ Qσ ][ D¯σ 0ΛB¯ I
]∥∥∥∥ .
Therefore, the induced norm from
[
w
x¯0
]
to the estimation
error e is less than γ if (27) holds.
We note that searching over stable systems Qσ and Zσ
such that (27)-(28) hold is a convex optimization but infinite
dimensional optimization. In what follows, we will reduce
(27)-(28) to finite dimensional convex optimization at the
cost of finding sub-optimal (but arbitrarily close to optimal)
solutions. To this end, according to Lemma 6, since (Qσ ,Zσ )
is stable, one can approximate them by FIR input-output
switching systems. In doing so, in general, it becomes
challenging to satisfy (28) exactly and hence we need to
relax (28). The result is summarized in the following:
Theorem 12: Suppose there exist 0≤ ε¯ < 1 and FIR input-
output switching systems Qσ ,Zσ ∈S MIO of some degree M
such that∥∥∥∥[ ΛB¯ I ]+ [ Zσ Qσ ][ D¯σ 0ΛB¯ I
]∥∥∥∥ ≤ γ¯, (30)∥∥∥∥ΛA¯+ [ Zσ Qσ ][ C¯σΛA¯− I
]∥∥∥∥ < ε¯. (31)
Then the optimal cost γ∗ satisfies
γ∗ ≤ γ¯+ ε¯
1− ε¯ γ¯.
Proof: Immediate from the error dynamics given in
(25).
We emphasize that (30)-(31) are in the so-called model-
matching form and they can be solved using the methods
developed in [8] with arbitrary accuracy.
V. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
In this section, we derive the optimal state-estimator for
problem outlined in Example 7. We use Theorem 12 as
basis of our computations. The parameter values are given
in Example 7 and the attackers strategy can cause switches
in the C- and D-matrices as given by (12)-(13). First, we
will find the optimal state-estimator for the nominal case,
i.e., when σ (.) is constant and identically equal to 0. In this
case, the optimal cost is γ∗ = 5.0275 and the state-estimator
is given by
xˆ = Ty0a,
where the impulse response of T = {T (k)}∞k=0 is given by
T (0) =
 0 0.750.74 −0.065
−0.126 −0.031
 ,
T (1) =
 −1.25 −20.195 0
−0.906 −1
 ,
T (k) = 0, for k ≥ 2.
This state-estimator, however, does not result in a stable
approximation error in the presence of DoS attack. One
can use the method developed in this paper to find a stable
state-estimator that is resilient to DoS attack strategy. In this
example, we apply Theorem 12 and search for input-output
switching (Qσ ,Zσ ) of degree 1. Furthermore, we let Ξ to be
the set of all binary sequences. For this case, we manage to
find a stable state-estimator with optimal cost of γ∗ = 32.5.
The optimal state-estimator is given by xˆ = Tσyσa where T
σ
is an output-only switching system of degree one. At each
time instant t,
xˆ(t) =
t
∑
τ=t−4
Tσ(t) (t− τ)yσ(τ)a (τ) ,
where
T i =
{
T i (k)
}4
k=0 , for i = 1,2,
is the FIR impulse response of T i. The numerical values for
the impulse response terms of T 1 are
T 1 (0) =
 0.24 0.440.37 −0.17
0.06 −0.17
 ,T 1 (1) =
 0.25 00.39 0
0.94 0
 ,
T 1 (2) =
 0.02 00.14 0
0.07 0
 ,T 1 (3) =
 −0.21 00.01 0
−0.3 0
 ,
T 1 (4) =
 −2.1 0−0.06 0
−0.93 0

And the impulse reponse of T 2 is given by
T 2 (0) =
 −1.5 00.98 0
0.66 0
 ,T 2 (1) =
 3.75 00.07 0
0.61 0
 ,
T 2 (2) =
 0 0−0.06 0
−0.05 0
 ,T 2 (3) =
 0 0−0.03 0
−0.45 0
 ,
T 2 (4) =
 −2.25 00.05 0
−0.77 0
 .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, utilizing the operator framework, we first
parametrized the set of all stable state-estimators resilient to
DoS attack. This was carried out by converting the problem
to a state estimation problem for linear switched systems
where the attacker’s strategy prescribes the switching law.
Furthermore, we showed that the set of generalized Luen-
berger observers captures all stable state-estimators. Then,
we cast the problem of finding the optimal estimator as a
convex optimization over the set of stable factors of the
observer operator-gain. This optimization, for the l∞ induced
norm, can be rewritten as a linear program which can be
solved efficiently.
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